Charter Remedies in 2001: Proceeding Cautiously by Sgayias, David, Q.C.




Volume 16 (2002) Article 15
Charter Remedies in 2001: Proceeding Cautiously
David Sgayias Q.C.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Sgayias, David Q.C.. "Charter Remedies in 2001: Proceeding Cautiously." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases Conference 16. (2002).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol16/iss1/15
   
CHARTER REMEDIES IN 2001: 
PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY 
David Sgayias, Q.C.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Charter guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of all Canadians. It 
does this through two kinds of provisions. The first are provisions describing the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed. The second are provisions providing remedies or 
sanctions for breaches of these rights. …1 
Litigation under the Charter2 has been preoccupied with the content of the 
guaranteed rights and freedoms. Remedies have usually taken a back seat. That 
is understandable, since the question of remedy is reached only once an in-
fringement of a right or freedom has been established.3 However, litigation 
under the Charter should not be mistaken for academic debate. The pursuit of a 
remedy lies at the heart of every Charter case. Only a remedy can give sub-
stance to a right or freedom that is found to have been infringed. 
Remedies required the attention of the Supreme Court of Canada in a half 
dozen Charter decisions handed down over the past year. Those decisions treat 
a wide variety of issues arising under both  
of the remedial provisions, subsection 24(1) of the Charter and  
subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. They tend to confirm the exist-
ing jurisprudence and to exhibit a cautious approach to Charter remedies, an 
approach under which the court’s remedy should respect the institutional role of 
the legislature. 
II. COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION 
In a pair of cases decided in 2001 the Supreme Court of Canada returned to 
the question of how to determine whether a tribunal is a “court of competent 
jurisdiction” within the meaning of subsection 24(1) of the Charter. That sub-
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section confers a right to seek a remedy from a court of competent jurisdiction.4 
In Mills v. R. and subsequent cases the Court had established a three-pronged 
test to identify a court of competent jurisdiction: the tribunal must possess, 
independently of the Charter, jurisdiction over the person, over the subject 
matter, and over the remedy.5 In its 2001 decisions, the Court confirms the 
three-pronged test and goes on to elaborate the method for determining whether 
the third prong is met, namely whether the tribunal has the jurisdiction to grant 
the remedy sought. The Court adopts and applies a “functional and structural” 
approach to determining the competence of a tribunal to grant Charter reme-
dies. 
The first case of the pair is R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., referred to as the 
Dunedin Construction case.6 The issue was whether a justice of the peace 
exercising trial jurisdiction under provincial offences legislation could award 
costs against the Crown for failure to make disclosure in violation of the Char-
ter. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the narrow statutory jurisdiction of 
the provincial offences court to award costs against the Crown in certain lim-
ited circumstances was sufficient to establish jurisdiction to make an award of 
costs for a Charter breach. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld that decision, 
but upon different reasoning. Chief Justice McLachlin, for the Court, rejects the 
“type of” approach under which a tribunal may issue Charter remedies similar 
in type to the remedies it is empowered by statute to issue.7 Instead the Chief 
Justice finds jurisdiction to award costs by examining the function and structure 
of the tribunal in question as a criminal trial court. 
After identifying the propositions as to the interpretation of subsection 24(1) 
that emerge from the Court’s previous decisions, the Chief Justice summarizes: 
…the task of the court in interpreting s. 24 of the Charter is to achieve a broad, 
purposive interpretation that facilitates direct access to appropriate and just Charter 
remedies under ss. 24(1) and (2), while respecting the structure and practice of the 
existing court system and the exclusive role of Parliament and the legislatures in 
prescribing the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals.8  
The challenge is to reconcile the conflict inherent in subsection 24(1). The 
provision promises convenient, effective and creative Charter remedies. How-
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  As to the right to a remedy, see Nelles v. Ontario, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170, at 196 (per Lamer 
J.); Mills v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 881 (per Lamer J., dissenting). 
5
  [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 890. See also Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, para. 
63 (per McLachlin J.), and Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75, para. 
22 (per La Forest J.). 
6
  Supra, note 1. 
7
  Id., paras. 30-34. 
8
  Id., para. 24. 
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ever, it seeks to deliver those remedies within a system of courts and tribunals 
established, for the most part, without contemplation of the Charter. There is a 
sense of trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. The solution appears to lie 
in making the hole a little bit bigger, that is, allowing the existing system to 
better accommodate Charter remedies. 
The focus of the analysis remains the statutory jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
Chief Justice McLachlin puts the issue in this way: 
Whether a court or tribunal enjoys the “power to grant the remedy sought” is, first 
and foremost, a matter of discerning the intention of Parliament or the Legislature. 
The governing question in every case is whether the legislator endowed the court or 
tribunal with the power to pronounce on Charter rights and to grant the remedy 
sought for the breach of these rights.9 
In the rare case, the grant of remedial power may be express. Indeed, the 
Court dealt with such a case earlier in the year, when it considered the scope of 
the Charter jurisdiction conferred upon extradition judges by the explicit terms 
of the Extradition Act.10 Much more commonly, the search is for an implied 
legislative grant of remedial power. That search, the Chief Justice explains, is 
to be conducted by way of a functional and structural approach. 
The functional and structural approach is founded upon the presumption that 
the legislature intended a tribunal to resolve Charter issues where the tribunal is 
suited to do so by virtue of its function and structure.11 The presumption arises 
because the legislature is taken to have intended to integrate Charter rights and 
remedies into the existing jurisdictional scheme.12 The function of the particular 
tribunal, its purpose or mandate, should be evaluated to determine whether it is 
practical and appropriate to have the tribunal resolve Charter issues arising in 
relation to its operations. The structure of the tribunal should be evaluated to 
determine whether it possesses the expertise, resources and procedural tools 
necessary to resolve Charter issues effectively.13 These analyses are conducted 
against the possibility that there may be a more appropriate forum, most likely 
a superior court, to remedy the Charter infringement. 
Applying the functional and structural approach to the situation in Dunedin 
Construction McLachlin C.J. finds that the provincial offences court, as a 
quasi-criminal court, functions much as a criminal court does and has a similar 
structure. Therefore, the provincial offences court should be assumed to possess 
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the power that criminal courts possess to impose awards of costs against the 
Crown.  
At first blush, the adoption of the functional and structural approach appears 
likely to broaden the range of tribunals providing Charter remedies. That may 
well be the case for tribunals that act as quasi-criminal trial courts. The practi-
cality of having such trial courts deal with Charter issues seems irresistible. 
However, the result of the functional and structural approach for other types of 
tribunals is less obvious. Administrative tribunals are characterized by a diver-
sity of functions and structures. Chief Justice McLachlin suggests that the 
enabling statute may have a more prominent role to play in assessing an admin-
istrative tribunal’s jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies.14 While it may be 
assumed that the legislature intended a criminal trial court to possess a fairly 
standard set of remedial powers, no similar assumption can be safely applied to 
the wide variety of administrative tribunals. 
Chief Justice McLachlin recognizes that a critical factor in the analysis of an 
administrative tribunal’s jurisdiction may be “the presence or absence of safe-
guards necessary to permit the tribunal to give fair and informed decisions on 
Charter rights and award remedies for their breach.”15 While not mentioned by 
the Chief Justice, one of the necessary safeguards is likely the institutional 
independence of the tribunal. Earlier in 2001, the Supreme Court confirmed 
that it was up to the legislature to determine the degree of independence af-
forded an administrative tribunal.16 That degree of independence may well be a 
sound indicator of the legislature’s intention as to the Charter jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. Where the legislature has created a tribunal that possesses little or no 
institutional independence, it is difficult to assume that the legislature intended 
that tribunal to decide claims for Charter remedies.  
Much dust will have to settle before the effect of the functional and struc-
tural test on the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals becomes apparent. The 
test may prove easier to describe than to apply, particularly in the context of 
administrative tribunals. That has been the case with the somewhat analogous 
“pragmatic and functional” approach to determining the standard for judicial 
review of administrative tribunals, in respect of which litigation has been unre-
lenting.17 The first application of the new test to an administrative tribunal may 
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  Id., paras. 64-66. 
15
  Id., para. 67. 
16
  Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licens-
ing Branch), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781. 
17
  The pragmatic and functional approach was articulated in Syndicat national des employés 
de la commission scolaire régionale de l’Outaouais v. U.E.S., local 298 (sub nom. U.E.S., Local 
298 v. Bibeault), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1048. Since that decision, there have been over 30 considerations 
of the issue by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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come in the context of subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Dune-
din Construction McLachlin C.J. suggests that the test of a tribunal’s power to 
consider issues under subsection 52(1) is also functional and structural in na-
ture.18 This is an issue that divided the Supreme Court when it last considered 
the issue in Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission).19 The Court will 
have the opportunity in the near future to revisit the issue and to consider 
whether the functional and structural approach should be extended to subsec-
tion 52(1).20  
The Supreme Court did not have to wait for its first opportunity to apply the 
freshly-minted test in a criminal law context. The same day as Dunedin Con-
struction, the Court handed down its decision in R. v. Hynes.21 The Court ap-
plied the functional and structural approach, but split five to four as to the 
result. 
The issue in Hynes was whether the judge conducting a preliminary inquiry 
under the Criminal Code was a court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose 
of excluding evidence under subsection 24(2) of the Charter. The existing 
jurisprudence, notably Mills v. R.22 and R. v. Seaboyer,23 suggested that the 
preliminary inquiry judge was not a court of competent jurisdiction. Chief 
Justice McLachlin, for the majority in Hynes, finds that the functional and 
structural test leads to the same conclusion.24 The functional aspect of the test 
appears to have been determinative. The preliminary hearing judge performs a 
pre-trial screening process and generally is without authority to grant remedies. 
Exercising jurisdiction under section 24 of the Charter could transform the 
preliminary inquiry, turning it into a forum for trying Charter breaches, thereby 
complicating and lengthening the hearings. The trial judge is better equipped to 
resolve the subsection 24(2) issues and, unlike the preliminary inquiry judge, is 
subject to correction on appeal. 
Mr. Justice Major, for the minority, accepts the functional and structural test, 
but rejects the majority’s application of it. The most telling factor for Major J. 
appears to be the existing jurisdiction of the preliminary inquiry judge to ex-
clude evidence on common law grounds.25 Given it is within the preliminary 
inquiry judge’s function to determine the admissibility of statements for com-
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  Supra, note 1, paras. 72-73. 
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  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854. 
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  Martin v. Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 22 (QL); 
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  2001 SCC 82. 
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  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, at 637-39 (per McLachlin J.). 
24
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  Id., paras. 74-76, 95-96. 
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mon law purposes, Major J. asks how can Parliament not be taken to have 
intended that the preliminary inquiry judge make such determinations for Char-
ter purposes. 
Hynes shows that it will not always be easy to characterize the function of 
the tribunal in question. That is what divides the Court. The minority do not 
share the majority’s characterization of the preliminary inquiry as principally a 
screening process. The minority place greater emphasis on the discovery func-
tion, in respect of which the preliminary inquiry judge’s determination as to the 
admission and exclusion of evidence takes on greater importance. 
The characterization of a tribunal’s function and the evaluation of its struc-
ture will depend primarily upon an analysis of the legislation under which the 
tribunal operates. However, the analysis will not be entirely statutory. The 
functional and structural approach analysis will extend to the tribunal’s prac-
tices and resources and to the practical role of its decision-making.26 That 
analysis may well require evidentiary support. 
In principle, the legislature has the final word as to whether a court or an 
administrative tribunal has the jurisdiction to issue remedies under subsection 
24(1) of the Charter. Indeed, the legislature may go so far as to confer that 
jurisdiction on a tribunal at the expense of the provincial superior court.27 The 
functional and structural approach acknowledges the legislature’s primary role, 
but proceeds to provide some flexibility in accommodating Charter claims 
within the existing system of courts and administrative tribunals. In Dunedin 
Construction and Hynes, much as in Mills 15 years earlier, the Court exhibits 
cautious respect for the existing institutional arrangements. 
III. REPAIRING LEGISLATION 
It has been 10 years since the Supreme Court of Canada in Schachter v. 
Canada28 laid out the remedial options available where legislation is found to 
infringe the Charter. Schachter established that not only could infringing legis-
lation be struck down, it could be repaired by severance, reading down or read-
ing in. All these options received some consideration by the Supreme Court in 
2001. 
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  Supra, note 1, para. 46. 
27
  Consider Weber v. Ontario Hydro, supra, note 5, where the jurisdiction of the provincial 
superior court to entertain an action for damages for breach of the Charter was held to be ousted by 
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The Supreme Court was faced with a choice between reading down and 
striking down in R. v. Ruzic.29 At issue was section 17 of the Criminal Code,30 
which defined when the defence of duress would be available. The Court found 
that the restrictions placed on the defence of duress by section 17 infringed 
section 7 of the Charter. Faced with this, the Crown invited the Court to read 
the offending restrictions out of section 17 in order to avoid the section being 
declared invalid. 
The Court acknowledges the option of reading down and appears to be pre-
pared to consider its application in a case where the impugned legislative provi-
sion offends the Charter not because it is over-inclusive, but because it is drawn 
too narrowly. There is no reason why reading down should be restricted to 
cases of over-inclusion. The underlying principle is that a provision capable of 
more than one interpretation should be given the interpretation that is constitu-
tional.31 That principle should apply whether the interpretation that avoids 
conflict with the Charter is narrower or broader than the competing interpreta-
tion. 
In Ruzic, reading down is rejected because the impugned provision does not 
admit an interpretation that would meet the requirements of section 7 of the 
Charter.32 Mr. Justice LeBel, for the Court, concludes: 
The appellant’s attempts at reading down s. 17, in order to save it, would amount to 
amending it to bring it in line with the common law rules. This interpretation badly 
strains the text of the provision and may become one more argument against up-
holding its validity.33 
This illustrates the inherent limit on reading down as a technique to avoid 
invalidity. It is available only where there is a reasonable competing interpreta-
tion that is constitutional.34  
The rejection of reading down in Ruzic was made easier because the com-
mon law was waiting to take the place of the invalid section 17. The common 
law defence of duress had never been completely displaced by section 17 and 
had continued to develop in a way that met the Charter concerns. Striking down 
section 17 did not leave accused persons without a defence, because the com-
mon law would be available.  
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  [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687. 
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  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
31
  Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at 1078 (per Lamer J.); 
R. v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, para. 22 (per McLachlin and Iacobucci JJ.). 
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Striking down was seen as an unattractive option in R. v. Sharpe.35 At issue 
was the offence of possession of child pornography.36 The majority in the Su-
preme Court found that the impugned provision offended paragraph 2(b) of the 
Charter and could not be completely saved under section 1. The provision 
failed the section 1 analysis because it was overbroad in two respects.37 Never-
theless, the majority declined to hold the provision to be invalid. They chose 
instead to repair the defects in the impugned provision by reading in exceptions 
in order to avoid the overbreadth. 
Reading in was identified in Schachter as a legitimate remedial option, albeit 
one to be used only in the clearest of cases.38 The Supreme Court has employed 
reading in exceptionally, in order to remedy under-inclusiveness.39 However, in 
cases of over-inclusiveness, the Court has preferred to leave it to legislators to 
come up with an alternative to the invalid provisions.40 In Sharpe, the Court 
was not prepared to leave the remedy to the legislators. Striking down the 
provision in its entirety appeared disproportionate. Chief Justice McLachlin, for 
the majority, states: 
…The difficulty with this remedy is that it nullifies a law that is valid in most of its 
applications. Until Parliament can pass another law, the evil targeted goes unreme-
died. Why, one might well ask, should a law that is substantially constitutional be 
struck down simply because the accused can point to a hypothetical application that 
is far removed from his own case which might not be constitutional?41 
The majority concludes that the preferred course is to repair the impugned 
provision by reading in the exceptions necessary to meet the Charter’s require-
ments. Reading in is available because the majority is able to “identify a dis-
tinct provision that can be read into the existing legislation to preserve its 
constitutional balance.”42 The majority proceeds to draft exception clauses to 
                                                                                                                                                              
35
  [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45. 
36
  Criminal Code, supra, note 30, s. 163.1(4). 
37
  Supra, note 35, para. 110. 
38
  Supra, note 28, at 718 (per Lamer C.J.) and at 728-29 (per LaForest J.). 
39
  Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, paras. 176-180 (per McLachlin J.); Vriend v. Alber-
ta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, para. 144 ff. (per Cory and Iacobucci JJ.).   
40
  Hunter v. Southam Inc. (sub nom. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Com-
bines Investigation Branch) v. Southam Inc.), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 168-69 (per Dickson J.); 
Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232, at 252 (per McLachlin 
J.); Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, para. 86. 
41
  Supra, note 35, para. 111. Constitutional exemption is also rejected: id., para. 113. 
42
  Id., para. 115. 
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respond to the defects that had been identified with some precision during the 
section 1 analysis of the impugned provision.43 
Reading in the exception clauses is considered appropriate because it will 
further Parliament’s objective in enacting the child pornography scheme. The 
exception clauses will preclude the operation of the legislation only in the 
situations most remote from the overall objective of protecting children. The 
“force of the statute” will not be undermined.44 Chief Justice McLachlin sug-
gested that the exception clauses are the sort of provision that Parliament would 
have adopted had it known the limitations of the Charter.45 
Reading in could be used in Sharpe because the remedy was simple and ob-
vious. The Charter defects were narrow and could be easily targeted by fairly 
straightforward exception clauses. The redrafting was minimal. There appeared 
to be no real choices to be made as to how to meet the constitutional require-
ments. It was not a case where the selection from a range of alternatives needed 
to be left to Parliament. Seen this way, Sharpe does not represent a bold, new 
use of reading in. Rather, it fits within the Court’s established approach of 
resorting to reading in only in the obvious and exceptional case. 
The choices that would need to be made discouraged judicial repair of the 
legislation in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General).46 At issue was the exclu-
sion of agricultural workers from Ontario’s statutory labour relations regime. 
The failure to provide some protection against unfair labour practices was held 
to infringe freedom of association under paragraph 2(d) of the Charter and not 
to be saved by section 1. The remedy was to strike down the clause that ex-
cluded agricultural workers from the general collective bargaining regime, but 
to suspend the declaration of invalidity for 18 months.47  
The Court in Dunmore prefers not to choose a replacement regime. Mr. Jus-
tice Bastarache, for the majority, identifies certain minimum requirements that 
are essential to afford protection to agricultural workers so that they may exer-
cise their freedom to form and maintain associations. The choices as to how to 
provide those minimum protections and as to whether to go further to provide 
agricultural workers with a more comprehensive labour relations regime are left 
to the legislature.48  
                                                                                                                                                              
43
  This is consistent with the admonition in Schachter, supra, note 28, at 702-05, that the 
first step in choosing a remedy is to define the extent of the inconsistency of the impugned legisla-
tion and the Charter, usually by way of the section 1 analysis.  
44
  Supra, note 35, para. 122. 
45
  Id., paras. 124-25. 
46
  2001 SCC 94. 
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  Id., para. 66 (per Bastarache J., for the majority). 
48
  Id., para. 68. 
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At first blush, striking the exclusion clause, thereby entitling agricultural 
workers to the full scheme of collective bargaining rights, appears to be a fairly 
aggressive remedy. However, in this case, providing no regime whatsoever was 
not an alternative. The very point of the Charter analysis was that there had to 
be some statutory protection of the agricultural workers’ freedom to associate. 
A remedy that left no regime in place would be no remedy at all. Even then, the 
Court was prepared to tolerate that situation for a period of 18 months to allow 
the legislature to act. 
As Dunmore shows, the Supreme Court is reluctant to make choices that are 
legitimately within the sphere of the legislature. There are sound reasons for 
this reluctance. The legislature may possess the superior means to identify and 
evaluate the options, and to consult with the persons affected.49 The selection 
from among the options that meet Charter standards could be distorted if any 
one of those options has received judicial endorsement. Therefore, the Court 
will usually leave the choice, even on a temporary basis, to the legislature. The 
exception will be made in the case where the choice appears obvious to the 
Court. The identification of the obvious choice may prove easier in criminal 
cases such as Sharpe, where the Court possesses confidence in its expertise. It 
may also prove easier where the Court is invited by the Crown to make the 
choice.50 At the end of the day, it will be a matter of whether the Court is per-
suaded that the choice is so obvious that there really is no real choice to be 
made at all. 
IV. TEMPORARY VALIDITY 
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General),51 discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, is an example of suspension being used to temper the effect of a declara-
tion of invalidity. In that case, the legislature was allowed 18 months to come 
up with amendments. If it failed to do so, the full collective bargaining scheme 
would become available to agricultural workers. The period of temporary valid-
ity would allow the legislature to exercise its institutional role to provide the 
necessary statutory scheme. 
Suspension of declarations of invalidity was originally conceived as a means 
to avoid a legal vacuum during the hiatus before the legislature could react and 
                                                                                                                                                              
49
  Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons (Ontario), supra, note 40, at 253; Corbiere v. 
Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203, paras. 119-121. 
50
  Consider Baron v. R., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416, at 454, where Sopinka J. was not prepared to 
consider reading down the impugned legislation in the absence of a submission by the Crown that 
reading down would constitute a lesser intrusion into the role of the legislature. 
51
  Supra, note 46. See also, in a similar vein, R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd., 2001 
SCC 70, para. 52 (per Bastarache J., dissenting). 
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replace the invalid legislation.52 It has continued to be used in such situations. A 
recent example is R. v. Guignard,53 where a zoning by-law that offended para-
graph 2(b) of the Charter was permitted to remain in force for six months in 
order to avoid a legal vacuum as to land use planning.54  
Despite the caution expressed in Schachter v. Canada that suspension of 
declaration of invalidity is not intended to solve the problem of judicial intru-
sion upon the legislature’s role,55 the remedy does appear to be serving that 
purpose. Dunmore is an example. It echoes the Court’s decision in Corbiere v. 
Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development),56 where a 
suspension of the declaration of invalidity was seen to be a means to allow 
consultation with affected groups within a democratic process.57  
Temporary validity may well have a dual purpose. That appears to have been 
the case in Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance),58 where the Court 
held that legislation abolishing the system of supernumerary judges violated the 
constitutional guarantee of judicial independence. The declaration of invalidity 
was suspended to avoid the legal vacuum that would result, but also because: 
…it is not appropriate for this Court to dictate the approach that should be taken in 
order to rectify the situation. Since there is more than one way to do so, it is the 
government’s task to determine which approach it prefers. …59  
Given the dual purposes that may be served by temporary validity, it is 
somewhat surprising that the possibility of a suspended declaration of invalidity 
was not seriously considered in R. v. Sharpe. As discussed in the preceding 
section, the majority in that case rejects a declaration of invalidity as the appro-
priate remedy. The majority is concerned that “the evil targeted” by the im-
pugned legislation would go unremedied until Parliament could pass another 
law.60 However, that problem could be avoided if Parliament were afforded a 
period of temporary validity within which to pass a law that would fully meet 
Charter requirements. Temporary validity would appear to be tolerable where 
the defects in the existing law are, as in Sharpe, hypothetical and peripheral. 
                                                                                                                                                              
52
  Reference re Language Rights under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 (sub nom. Reference re Manitoba Language Rights), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721, at 758, 
767. 
53
  2002 SCC 14. 
54
  Id., para. 32. 
55
  Supra, note 28, at 715-17.  
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  Supra, note 49. 
57
  Id., paras. 116-18. See also M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 146 (per Iacobucci J.). 
58
  2002 SCC 13. 
59
  Id., para. 77 (per Gonthier J., for the majority). 
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The approach taken in Sharpe does accord with the view of Lamer C.J. ex-
pressed in Schachter, that: 
…reading in is much preferable [to a delayed declaration of invalidity] where it is 
appropriate, since it immediately reconciles the legislation in question with the re-
quirements of the Charter.61 
Consistent with this approach, McLachlin C.J. in Sharpe, having found reading 
in to be appropriate, sees no need to consider the alternative of temporary 
validity of the impugned section of the Criminal Code. There is no substantial 
comparative evaluation of the relative merits of the remedial alternatives. That 
sort of analysis is dismissed as unnecessary.62 
In recent years, the Court has employed temporary validity as a means of 
achieving Charter compliance while respecting the role of the legislature.63 The 
remedy appeared to be escaping its restriction in Schachter to cases where an 
immediate declaration of invalidity would produce unacceptable effects on the 
public. Dunmore and Mackin are consistent with the more flexible use of the 
temporary validity, while Sharpe seems to return to the orthodoxy of Schachter. 
Sharpe may prove to be the exception. It will be difficult to resist evaluating 
remedies on a comparative basis and to resist including in that comparison not 
only an immediate declaration of invalidity, but a declaration coupled with a 
temporary suspension. 
V. DAMAGES 
In 1994 the Supreme Court of Canada observed that the law concerning the 
awarding of damages in Charter cases was in an uncertain state.64 Not much has 
changed since. 
The issue that came before the Supreme Court in 2001 was the availability of 
damages where a law is determined to be unconstitutional. The case was 
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), discussed in the preceding 
section.65 The plaintiffs sought not only a declaration that the provincial legisla-
tion eliminating the system of supernumerary judges was unconstitutional, but 
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also damages for the violation of judicial independence. The trial judge dis-
missed the claim for damages, concluding that there is no right of action for 
damages for the enactment of a law subsequently declared unconstitutional.66 
The New Brunswick Court of Appeal disagreed. Mr. Justice Ryan, for the 
majority, stated: 
…it is inconceivable that the executive and legislative branches of government 
were oblivious to their assaults upon the third branch and its impact upon the inde-
pendence of that entity. They manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of their 
discretionary powers. In the context that I advance, neither negligence nor intention 
is requisite to found liability for damages. They are relevant but not conditions. 
Damages should follow and it matters nought whether there is good faith or bad 
faith on the part of the executive branch, the legislative branch or the two in con-
cert.67 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the claim for damages was dismissed. Mr. 
Justice Gonthier, for the majority, deals with the claim for damages both under 
subsection 24(1) of the Charter and under the ordinary law of civil liability.68 
As to the former, he confirms that a declaration that a law is invalid under the 
Charter will not, as a rule, give rise to an action for damages under subsection 
24(1). Relying on Schachter v. Canada,69 Mr. Justice Gonthier states: 
In short, although it cannot be asserted that damages may never be obtained follow-
ing a declaration of unconstitutionality, it is true that, as a rule, an action for dam-
ages brought under s. 24(1) of the Charter cannot be combined with an action for a 
declaration of invalidity based on s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.70 
He concludes that the plaintiffs are not entitled to damages merely because the 
legislation at issue has been found to be unconstitutional.71 
The result in Mackin is consistent with the approach to remedies in Guimond 
v. Quebec (Attorney General),72 where a bare allegation of unconstitutionality 
was held not to be a sufficient basis for a claim in damages under subsection 
24(1) of the Charter.73 It is also consistent with the observation by McLachlin 
C.J. in the Dunedin Construction case: 
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… If a law is inconsistent with the Charter, s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 pro-
vides that it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency. On the other hand, if a 
government action is inconsistent with the Charter, s. 24 provides remedies for the 
inconsistency.74 [emphasis in the original] 
In Mackin, Gonthier J. considers the possibility of government action that 
was inconsistent with the Charter. He finds no evidence to suggest that the 
government of New Brunswick acted negligently, in bad faith or by abusing its 
powers, or that the government had knowledge that eliminating the office of 
supernumerary judge was unconstitutional.75 Neither subsection 24(1) of the 
Charter nor the general law of civil liability provide for liability on the part of 
the government or its officials simply because a law is invalid. Mr. Justice 
Gonthier explains: 
…if they act in good faith and without abusing their power under prevailing law 
and only subsequently are their acts found to be unconstitutional, they will not be 
liable. Otherwise, the effectiveness and efficiency of government action would be 
excessively constrained. Laws must be given their full force and effect as long as 
they are not declared invalid. Thus it is only in the event of conduct that is clearly 
wrong, in bad faith or an abuse of power that damages may be awarded.76 
The above statement is fairly conventional. However, there is one peculiar-
ity. That is the reference to liability for conduct that is “clearly wrong.” The 
phrase appears more than once in describing the sort of conduct that may attract 
liability where a law is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.77 It is 
unclear whether “clearly wrong” is intended to import liability where there is 
neither bad faith nor an abuse of power. The phrase may merely be another way 
of expressing the element of intentional infliction of harm with knowledge of 
lack of legal authority that is inherent in bad faith and abuse of power.78 
Mr. Justice Gonthier speaks of legislative bodies enjoying a “limited immu-
nity” against actions based upon the invalidity of legislation.79 Perhaps this 
limited immunity, with its possibility of liability for bad faith or abuse of 
power, applies only to municipal legislative bodies or the like, as considered in 
Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg (City).80 That interpretation seems rea-
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sonable given Gonthier J.’s apparent approval in Mackin,81 as in Guimond,82 of 
a passage from Dussault and Borgeat, Administrative Law: A Treatise, to the 
effect that Parliament or a legislature cannot be held liable for anything they do 
in the exercise of their legislative powers. It would seem that the day of actions 
against Parliament for bad faith in enacting legislation has not yet arrived. 
Finally, it should be noted that the dismissal of the damages claim does not 
mean that the decision in Mackin will not have financial consequences. Despite 
the suspension of the declaration of invalidity, the plaintiffs are entitled to take 
advantage of the finding of unconstitutionality of the legislation which did 
away with their supernumerary status.83 They may be able to claim a statutory 
entitlement to the salary and benefits they would have been paid but for the 
abolition of their supernumerary status by the unconstitutional legislation. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The dichotomy of remedies under subsection 24(1) of the Charter and sub-
section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 continues. The Court’s decisions 
concerning subsection 24(1) represent a re-affirmation of existing principles, 
with some hint of future development of the concept of court of competent 
jurisdiction as the functional and structural approach takes hold. The Court’s 
decisions concerning subsection 52(1) reflect the intimate connection between 
remedies and the substantive issues of the compliance of legislation with Char-
ter requirements. Common to the decisions concerning both subsection 24(1) 
and subsection 52(1) is a caution in the exercise of remedial power so as to 
avoid any unnecessary interference with the role of the legislature. 
                                                                                                                                                              
81
  Supra, note 58, para. 78. 
82
  Supra, note 72, para. 14. 
83
  Supra, note 58, paras. 75-76. 




CHARTER REMEDIES IN 2001: PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY 405 
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 405 
II. Court of Competent Jurisdiction ............................................ 405 
III. Repairing Legislation ........................................................... 410 
IV. Temporary Validity .............................................................. 414 
V. Damages ................................................................................ 416 
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................ 419 
 
 
